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Abstract. Altruistic punishment — punishment of those contributing
little to the pubic good — has been proposed as an explanation for the
extraordinary extent of human culture relative to other species. culture.
Altruistic punishment is seen as supporting the high levels of altruism
necessary for the cooperation underlying this culture, including informa-
tion exchange. However, humans will also sometimes punish those who
contribute to the public good, even when those contributions directly
benefit the punisher. This behaviour — antisocial punishment — is neg-
atively correlated with GDP, and as such may be seen as a hinderance
to overall wellbeing. In this chapter, we pursue a better understanding
of antisocial punishment in particular and costly punishment in general.
We explore existing data showing cultural variation in the propensity to
punish, and ask how such sanctioning, whether of those who give much
or little, affects the individuals who conduct it. We hypothesise that
costly punishment is a mechanism for regulating investment between
different levels of society, for example whether an individual’s current
focus should be on their nation, village, family or self. We suggest that
people are less likely to antisocially punish those they consider to be
“in group”, and that the propensity to apply this identity to strangers
may vary with socio-economic-political context and resulting individual
experience. In particular, an increased propensity to express antisocial
punishment should correlate with a lower probability of benefiting from
public goods, as may be the case where there is low rule of law. We show
both analysis of behavioural economics experiments and evolutionary
social simulations to support our hypotheses, and suggest implications
for policy makers and other organisations that may wish to intervene to
improve general economic wellbeing.
Keywords: antisocial punishment (ASP); altruistic punishment (AP);
costly punishment; public goods; public goods games (PGG); behavioural
economics; altruism; cooperation; in-group / out-group assessment.
1 Introduction
That friendship lasts longest—if there is a chance of its being a success—
in which friends both give and receive gifts. — The Ha´vama´l3.
The variety of human cultures is one of the joys of contemporary human life.
However, a respect and appreciation for diversity cannot be allowed to mask the
observation that cultural variation can include measurable differences in metrics
that have nearly-universal cross-cultural appeal, for example reducing infant
mortality or increasing literacy. For the last several years we have been striving
to understand cultural variation in one such trait: the propensity of individuals
to optimise economic collaboration when thrown into a group together. In this
chapter we review our progress to date. We also examine the policy implications
of our findings on cooperation and punishment, particularly for organisations
wishing to aid development or rebuild communities in areas experiencing conflict.
The behaviour we are studying is called anti-social punishment (ASP). Tech-
nically, ASP occurs when an individual is willing to pay a penalty to punish
a member of their own group, where the victim of the punishment has been
generous, providing more or equal contributions to their mutual group than the
punisher. The term punishment here is being used to describe a punisher delib-
erately paying a cost to have money taken away from the the victim of their
punishment. For the data analysed here, this is all done anonymously in an ex-
perimental context, with the experimenter acting as the go-between, executing
the instructions of the participants. In ordinary experience, we believe this be-
haviour to map to the situation where generosity or philanthropy is rejected,
resented or punished. In sociology, this relates to the theory of the gift, where
healthy equal exchange increases bonds, but gifts that cannot or will not be
reciprocated are seen as a power move, an extreme version of which is potlatch
(Mauss, 1967).
Systematic cultural variation in ASP behaviour was first documented in the
economics literature by Herrmann et al. (2008a), and Benedikt Herrmann has
been one of our collaborators throughout this project. Although the data Her-
rmann et al. provide is based on formal laboratory experiments where partici-
pants play a ‘game’ for money, the results correlate highly with national Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), suggesting the possibility that the behaviour mea-
sured in the laboratory may have fundamental impact on the economic wellbeing
of a nation, though of course the reverse could also be true. Further, the variation
between cultures is not arbitrary, but rather appears clustered by global region.
Thus Boston, several cities in Northern Europe, the Far East, and Melbourne
show high levels of profitable economic collaboration, while Athens, Istanbul,
regions of the Middle East and of the former Soviet Union show relatively low
ability to collaborate for profit, and higher levels of ASP.
If we can find an explanation for such variation, we might not only be re-
warded with a better understanding of culture more generally. We might also
3 Translated by Martin Clarke (1923), also quoted by Mauss (1967).
be in a better situation to administer economic aid, or to otherwise shape in-
tervention policies. If generosity is perceived as a power move to be resented
and, if possible, rejected, then clearly it is less likely to be effective. How can
we bring interventions to be perceived as a collaborative effort to mutually im-
prove economies and / or security? In the present chapter our focus is at the
level of the city and state, but there is also relevance to managing interpersonal
relationships and individual socialisation and well being.
This chapter begins with a review of the scientific context of our research.
We then review our findings, some of which have been published previously,
others of which are presented here for the first time. Overall, we have failed to
find any evolutionary context in which ASP can evolve unless we assume that
it carries some extra benefit beyond its economic costs. We hypothesise that
this benefit is social status awarded to those who punish. In the results given
here, we model the simplest case, which is awarding status regardless of whether
the punishment is altruistic (punishing those donating less than the punisher
to the group) or antisocial4. If we include this assumption, then we are able to
account for variation in ASP. We suggest that regional variation in ASP reflects
the extent to which in various societies one’s wellbeing depends on one’s relative
status within one’s own group rather than the group’s status in relation to other
groups. After reviewing these findings, we discuss policy implications for our
work. We make a number of suggestions, then close with our conclusions.
2 Scientific Background: Costly Punishment
Herrmann et al. (2008a) show that in some human subject pools (e.g. university
undergraduates in Boston, Melbourne, Chengdu and Zurich) group members
tend to quickly exploit an experimental context in which mutual investment leads
to mutual benefits. However, in other societies (e.g. university undergraduates in
Muscat, Istanbul, Minsk and Athens) substantial proportions of participants will
pay a fee in order to penalize group members more generous to the group’s public
good than themselves. This is despite the fact that this generosity is benefiting
all group members other than the benefactor, including the punisher’s. Such
punishment of cooperation is called antisocial punishment (ASP).
Herrmann et al. sought correlates for the prevalence of ASP in a culture,
finding several. ASP inversely correlates with both Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and the Rule of Law (Kaufmann et al., 2004). They suggest that “weak
norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country
are significant predictors of antisocial punishment. Our results show that [...]
punishment opportunities are socially beneficial only if complemented by strong
social norms of cooperation.” But correlation does not demonstrate causation.
Can we be sure that the propensity for ASP does not itself lead to a weak rule
of law? Or that both could be caused by some other factor? In the next section,
we describe the data in greater detail, and try to answer these questions.
4 Of course, reality could be more subtle (Barclay, 2006; Sylwester et al., 2013a).
2.1 The Data: How Cooperation and Punishment Are Measured
All human subject data for this research was collected using a paradigm from
a relatively new branch of economics, called either experimental economics or
behavioural economics. Behavioural economics is similar to experimental psy-
chology, except that economists mandate certain conditions, for example all in-
dividuals must receive sufficient financial reward to be considered motivated.
Significantly, subjects can in no way be deceived, and must in fact demonstrate
understanding of the complete consequences of their own and the other team
members’ possible actions by passing a test before participating in the games.
Similarly, in cross-cultural experimental economics research, the players play for
tokens, to keep reasoning about proportions equally easy for subjects regardless
of local currency denominations (Herrmann et al., 2008b).
The standard behavioural economics experiment for assessing costly punish-
ment is called the Public Goods Game (PGG, Ledyard, 1995). In the basic
form of this game there is no punishment. In the standard form, a group is
determined by an experimenter, but members are not identified to each other
and only interact by computer screens5. This anonymity simplifies theoretical
analysis, by ensuring that group members do not act out of fear or expectation
of retribution or reward after the game. In a single round of PGG, each member
is given 20 tokens by the experimenter. Subjects are then allowed to contribute
any portion they choose of their allocation to the public pool. Allocations to
the public pool are multiplied by the experimenter then divided equally between
all group members. The multiplication factor is always greater than one but
smaller than the number of group members. As a result, the optimal outcome
for the group as a whole is for all to contribute everything, but individual in-
vestments are never fully returned. For example, if the multiplier is 3 and the
number of individuals is 4, then for every token an individual donates, they (and
every other member of the group) receive 3/4 of a token back. Thus individuals
who do not contribute anything or contribute less than others gain a financial
advantage relative to those others, at least for that round. A PGG therefore
represents a social dilemma because an individual’s interests are in conflict with
their group’s. In the experiments described below, PGGs are played repeatedly,
for ten consecutive rounds with the same groups.
In the punishment condition, after a round of PGG individuals can anony-
mously punish others. The target to be punished can only be identified only
by their previous round’s contribution to the public pool. Importantly, subjects
never learn any information about who punishes them, only the size of their most
recent contribution. Punishment is costly; in the studies described here, for ev-
ery token a punisher pays, the punishee loses three tokens6. When an individual
punishes someone who has contributed less than they have, this punishment is
5 In rural conditions the computers may be replaced with pen and paper for recording
decisions, then the results are communicated to group members by the experimenter.
6 Many other cost/effect ratios have been tried by other experimenters, these result
in quantitative but not qualitative shifts in behaviour. See (Sylwester et al., 2013a)
for a more complete review.
termed altruistic (AP) because the punisher pays a cost, yet the whole group
benefits if (as seems often to be the case) this action leads to higher contributions.
On the other hand, if punishers punish those who contribute more or equally to
themselves, the punishment is called anti-social. Herrmann et al. (2008a) were
the first to document societies with large amounts of ASP, and showed that this
could in some cases completely counter the expected benefits, in fact reducing
overall cooperation and payoffs to the subjects. In the Swiss contexts where
these experiments were first run, the opportunity to punish reliably resulted in
a better economic outcome for subjects playing the PGG. However, this was not
true in some societies with high levels of ASP. In most of the data reported here
(all of which is due to Herrmann et al.) subjects played two rounds of 10 PGG,
one with punishment and one without. For most subject pools the order of the
games (punishment or not) was randomised.
2.2 Previous Interpretations of Punishment Results
To fully understand the literature and history of work in costly punishment,
we must recognise that one goal of anthropology is explaining human unique-
ness. Why are humans the only species with advanced technology? Why are we
dominating the biomass of the planet with our ever-expanding population? The
explanation is not simple biology — it is not just our intelligence or our capacity
for tool use. The vast majority of population growth and technological complex-
ity is of very recent origin. Very human-like species existed and used primitive
tools for millions of years (Walker and Stringer, 2010). Urbanisation, agriculture,
writing and doctrinal religions (those that share their practices outside of small
close-knit tribal structures) all seem to date to no more than 8,000-12,000 years
ago, well after the first appearance of Homo sapiens.
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies have suggested or proposed an
extraordinary human propensity for cooperation as an explanation for the extent
of human culture (e.g. Gintis et al., 2003; Henrich et al., 2001). However, the
reasoning could just as easily be applied in reverse; it could be that a an ex-
traordinary human propensity for accumulating culture accounts for the extent
of human cooperation (Bryson, 2009). Thus the extent of human cooperation is
not yet considered fully accounted for. After the early PGG punishment results
(e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002), altruistic punishment was
regarded as a possible explanation for large-scale cooperation. Here too though
the reasoning seemed cyclic, as punishment can be a form of cooperation it-
self, and contrary to its reputation, altruistic behaviour is neither difficult to
evolve nor uniquely human (Cˇacˇe and Bryson, 2007; West et al., 2007; MacLean
et al., 2010). Swinging to the other extreme, the phenomenon of ASP has more
recently lead some scientists to emphasise the ‘dark side’ of human behaviour,
including a tendency for spite and hyper-competitiveness (Abbink and Sadrieh,
2009; Jensen, 2010; Sylwester et al., 2013a). Extremes of moral assessment and
defensiveness need to be guarded against if we are to understand what under-
lies these phenomenon. We believe the Herrmann et al. (2008a) results indicate
that punishment is part of a much more complex system of social regulation,
not a simple explanation for human cooperation and therefore culture. Here
we attempt to approach the explanation of costly punishment objectively, by
viewing both cooperation and punishment as biological phenomena and looking
for ultimate causes that might make such behaviour adaptive. In the next sec-
tion, we briefly review the sorts of explanations natural selection can provide for
behaviour.
2.3 Proximate and Ultimate Explanations
Fields like evolutionary anthropology and behavioural ecology work from the
assumption that behaviour is inseparable from the rest of the organism, including
in terms of its causal explanation. From the perspective of evolution there are at
least two types of causes for any trait (Mayr, 1961). Ultimate causes concern why
the behaviour is present in a population as whole — what role does it serve in
the evolutionary struggle? Contemporary evolutionary theory does not expect all
observed traits to be adaptations — some are incidental side-effects of historical
associations, since the selection process takes time and can only operate on the
material at hand. Nevertheless, it is at least a common first guess in evolutionary
approaches that an observed trait exists because it has historically provided
more advantage than disadvantage to those who hold it relative to those that do
not. Proximate causes in contrast describe mechanism — what triggers and/or
enables a particular organism to perform the behaviour in question. For example,
running may be ultimately a good way to escape, and proximately a response
to a loud noise. Note that for some species, flying or swimming is a better mode
of escape than running. Identifying the ultimate cause of a behaviour does not
mean that behaviour is necessarily the optimal mechanism for meeting that need.
Which behaviour will be expressed also depends on evolutionary (phylogenetic)
history.
A useful proximate mechanism may itself become an ultimate explanation
for some other trait. For example, hearing the sound of a predator may be the
proximate cause of fleeing, and the ultimate cause for large ears. This sort of
complexity has lead some to suggest that the distinction between these causes is
not real and creates an impediment to understanding. (e.g. Thierry, 2005; Laland
et al., 2011). However, the distinction was developed to address a still-common
error — thinking that a simple proximate explanation for a behaviour can dis-
place a complex ultimate one. While science generally favours simpler explana-
tions, because proximate and ultimate explanations address different questions
one cannot substitute for the other.
3 Building an Understanding of Anti-Social Investment
In this section we introduce our findings concerning an explanation for the be-
haviour termed anti-social punishment. We begin by explaining our current hy-
pothesis, then review the evidence we have discovered leading us to this hypoth-
esis.
3.1 Hypothesis: Punishment as Regulation
Our current hypothesis is that all punishment is an aggressive act, which some
proportion of any population is motivated to perform. A proximate reward for
aggression is increased social status, not only relative to the target of the aggres-
sive act but also to bystanders who witness the aggression. When an individual
becomes known to be aggressive, confronting that individual becomes associ-
ated with an increased cost, thus making avoiding confrontation via submissive
gestures a more attractive strategy (Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000). We also
hypothesise, however, that in contexts where cooperation is more likely to pro-
duce stable public goods, members of the population are also more likely inhibit
any tendency they might feel to be aggressive towards cooperators. We think
that for at least some proportion of the population, whether cooperative ges-
tures are accepted as useful or seen as another form of dominance / aggression
depends on whether the generous individual is seen as a member of a trusted
“in group”, or is seen as“out-group” — a potential invader. Thus the proximate
explanation for a population with relatively high ASP is a larger number of in-
dividuals assessing anonymous strangers playing a PGG as out-group, and the
ultimate explanation is a dependency on the expected utility of public goods in
that population’s socio-political-economic context. This expected utility is es-
timated by the individuals composing the population based on data from the
experience of their lives up until the experiment, as interpreted through prior
expectations communicated to those individuals by their culture, which reflects
the experience of many more individuals.
Our hypothesised ultimate benefit derives from the observation that an in-
vestment in a global public good comes at a cost of reduced investment not only
directly to the individual, but to other more-local goods such as the individual’s
family. The ultimate need to support many levels of investment may explain
the otherwise odd tendency of nearly all subjects to split their investment strat-
egy, keeping some proportion of the resources originally allocated to them by
the experimenter, and investing the rest. When Northern Europeans (includ-
ing Boston in the Herrmann et al. data) read the instructions concerning the
punishment condition of the PGG, their expected utility allocated to the public
good immediately increases. Interestingly, in the three cities tested in Australia
and Asia the initial expectation seems to be the same in both conditions, but
that expectation rises over the course of the multi-round game in response to
increased revenue as rounds are played. Whereas for Athens, Istanbul, the Mid-
dle East and the former Soviet Union neither expectations nor rewards increase,
and public goods investment stays approximately constant at a relatively low
level throughout.
Thus at an ultimate level, we hypothesise that variation in punishment strate-
gies may be an evolved mechanism for regulating global public goods investment
(versus more local or individual investment) to a level appropriate to that pop-
ulation’s economic context. What is appropriate is estimated in a distributed
fashion by the population’s individual experiences, and aggregated into a set of
collective norms and expectations that influence proximate responses to social
dilemmas.
In the remainder of this section we review our evidence for this hypothesis.
Where we describe human data results, these are derived from further analysis
of the original Herrmann et al. (2008a). The additional analysis was performed
mostly by Sylwester and Mitchell. However, we first turn to theoretical results
derived from simulation. Simulation is a process of analysing the full conse-
quences of a theory by describing it so thoroughly that it can be executed on
a computer. All systems of modelling theory are analytic processes performed
because, as Kokko and Lo´pez-Sepulcre (2007) phrases it, “our brains aren’t big
enough” to see all of our theories’ consequences. Thus for example, different
researchers might dispute whether a minimalist theory is really sufficient to ex-
plain the complex behaviour observed in the real world. Formal modelling can
demonstrate with certainty whether the results of a hypothesised system are as
predicted, though it cannot determine with certainty whether this reflects what
happens in the real world. Models are ultimately only theories, and their validity
is assessed by standard scientific processes of assessing fit to data and evaluating
unexpected predictions (see further Bryson et al., 2007; Whitehouse et al., 2012).
Computer modelling (simulations) also allows us to check for internal coherence
of our theories, since inconsistant theories are impossible to build and run as
programs.
Most of the modelling performed here is a form of simulation known as agent-
based modelling (ABM). That is, abstracted versions of both the individual
actors (agents) and the environment in which they act are programmed into
computers. The abstractions include the hypothesised minimal set of actions the
agents are capable of, knowledge the agents must retain to inform this action,
elements of the environment (including other agents) the agents may act on, and
environmental results of these actions. A computer then executes the operation
of the agents over time and reports the consequences. Where these are not com-
pletely deterministic, many experimental runs may be performed to discover the
distribution of results. Where characteristic of the agents or environment are
not known or believed to vary, again many runs can be performed with differ-
ent values of these, to measure the consequences. Here, most of the described
modelling has been performed by Powers and Taylor.
3.2 Ultimately, ASP Is Not Viable Unless It Correlates with Some
Other Benefit
We begin our presentation of evidence for our hypotheses by examining the ba-
sic question of the circumstances in which punishment could have evolved as a
strategy. The results presented here are based on multi-level evolutionary ABM.
A multi-level model allows us to manipulate the relative costs and benefits of
within-group and between-group competition. This is one way to think about
local versus global (in the biological sense of less-local) investment and com-
petition. Local competition occurs within the in group — for example, who in
my family gets the biggest piece of pie? In contrast, global competition occurs
between groups — for example, which family gets the most pies? Note that there
can be many levels of competition, and therefore selection. Families can join
together to compete as one village against another; villages may join to compete
as one state against another.
The multi-level ABM here extend from Powers et al. (2011). Within-group
competition is increased by increasing the group size, since this increases the vari-
ance in social behaviour within groups, and so increases the strength of within-
group selection. Between-group competition is likewise increased by decreasing
group size, since this increases the variance in social behaviour between groups,
and so increases the strength of between-group selection. The importance of
between-group competition is also increased by decreasing the probability that
individual agents find themselves in new groups, that is, by reducing the fre-
quency with which groups are reformed. This may be thought of as modelling a
decreased amount of communication and interdependency between groups in the
real world, e.g. little intermarriage. Note though that both mechanisms serve as
computationally-clear abstractions, and may represent more complex real-world
variations in rewards at the different levels. For example, climate change could
increase population pressure by reducing the amount of habitable territory. This
could result in increased migration, changing the scale of competition from more
local to more global.
Here we examine the viability of ASP in particular as a strategy, and also
how its availability as a strategy affects the utility of costly punishment as a
strategy over all. As in Powers et al. (2012), a linear public goods game with
punishment is played within groups once per generation. The payoffs from this
game determine the fitness of individuals, such that individuals with a high
absolute payoff produce more offspring. Groups remain together for a particular
number of generations. Then all individuals are considered a part of one global
migrant pool, from which the next generation of groups is formed. This so-called
dispersal stage creates between-group competition, since groups containing a
larger number of individuals at the time of dispersal produce a larger fraction of
the migrant pool, and hence have more impact in the next generation of groups.
The size of a group at the time of dispersal is in turn affected by the mean payoff
that its members receive from the public goods game.
In a thorough examination, Powers et al. could find no evolutionary context
in which ASP was adaptive against other social strategies, unless we assume
that punishment actually has a negative cost. That is, punishment must gener-
ate some benefit to the punisher in order for ASP to ever be adaptive. However,
as explained earlier, punishment is definitionally costly and also, relative to other
group members, altruistic, since any economic benefit accrued to the punisher
due to e.g. an increase in PG investment is shared by the others even though
they do not pay the cost of punishment. One example of how punishment might
benefit the punisher despite costing risk of injury, effort and time, is if punish-
ment takes the form of taking resources away from the target. If the punisher
keeps these for themself rather than sharing with the rest of the group, this
would compensate immediately for the risk of aggression (Taylor et al., 2013).
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(b) Groups reform after 30 generations.
Fig. 1: Evolution of strategy frequencies given that punishment provides direct
benefit. (a) When groups reform regularly, within-group competition is the main
driver of the evolutionary dynamics. Parameters: founding group size= 15, bene-
fit from cooperation= 0.9, cost to cooperating= 0.1, cost of being punished= 0.3,
cost of punishing= −0.1, groups randomly reformed every generation. (b) When
groups stay together for multiple generations, between-group competition sup-
ports cooperative strategies. Parameters: As for a but with groups reforming
every 30 generations.
However, even where the proximate outcome of punishment is fully public, there
may be other longer-term benefits to the punisher, such as increased social status
and its associated benefits (Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000). We know that al-
truistic punishment in in-group contexts does lead to increased status (Barclay,
2006; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010).
Our current guess is this latter option — that punishment is used to signal
or even generate dominance within a group. The benefits of social dominance
over the lifetime of the punisher may more than compensate for the immediate
cost of the punishment act (West et al., 2011). Indeed, dominance is often seen
as a form of long-term conflict resolution, because it reifies a particular set of
expectations of conflict outcome, thus reducing the amount of actual physical
conflict required (Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000; Bryson et al., 2012). Thus,
both AP and ASP may maintain or increase an individual’s rank in a dominance
hierarchy, which may in turn increase longe-term benefit and thus fitness relative
to those who do not (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Boehm, 1999; Rohwer,
2007). But this guess has yet to be turned into a formal hypothesis, let alone
tested. What we know from our simulations is only that some additional factor
must account for the existence of ASP.
Even in the case where punishment does result in intrinsic benefit, then there
is still an impact of local versus global competition. Where groups compete with
each other — in the present ABM, where they persist long enough to receive
fitness payoff for their public goods — prosocial (altruistic) punishment is still
selected for over ASP (see Figure 1a). Only when within-group competition is
the stronger selective force can even individually-advantageous ASP out compete
the other form of punishment (Figure 1b).
3.3 Punishment Alone Cannot Account for Human Sociality
As described in Section 2.2, the finding by Herrmann et al. (2008a), that pop-
ulations exist in which the introduction of punishment reduces performance in
PGG, was disruptive to those who believed that punishment explained excep-
tional levels of cooperation in humans. This result is sufficiently disruptive that
it has been attacked on methodological grounds, either against behavioural eco-
nomics in general or as practiced in the specific cases. However, modelling results
show that even in pure theory, once ASP is taken into account, punishment can-
not be considered solely a mechanism for increasing cooperation (Rand et al.,
2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011; Powers et al., 2012).
As Figure 2a demonstrates, even where punishment is exclusively altruistic,
cooperation will not necessarily be selected for. Only where group size is rela-
tively small and relatively stable (there are many generations between dispersal
stages) do cooperative strategies reliably evolve. This is because such conditions
effectively increase the variance in social behaviour between groups (see Powers
et al. 2012), and so create conditions for effective group selection. As a result,
cooperation (including AP) is more likely to be a beneficial strategy and increase
in prevalence. Conversely, a large founding group size and / or frequent group-
mixing increases within-group variation in social behaviour, and hence makes
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Fig. 2: Percentage of Monte Carlo simulation runs in which pro-social punishment
and cooperation together constituted more than 90% of the global population at
equilibrium: (a) without the presence of anti-social punishment; (b) with anti-
social punishment included. Note here (unlike Figure 1) punishment is assumed
to be costly, thus ASP never dominates as a strategy, yet the impact is still
significant. A small founding group size and/or infrequent group mixing increases
the variance in social behaviour between groups, and thus makes between-group
competition a major driver of the evolutionary dynamics. After Fig. 3 in Powers
et al. (2012).
within-group competition a larger driver of the evolutionary dynamics. In such
cases, defection and ASP is favoured. Figure 2b shows us is that introducing ASP
reduces the evolutionary contexts where cooperation is favoured even further.
Punishment is by no means required for cooperation. That cooperation is
adaptive in a wide range of circumstances has been long understood. In fact,
cooperation between replicators is necessary for the existence of any organism
with more than one gene — that is, for all life (Dawkins, 1982). It is even easier
to explain in multi-gene organisms (Hamilton, 1964). In our opinion, the most
interesting implication of our simulations is that at an ultimate level, punish-
ment can be used either to increase or decrease cooperative investment in public
goods. In contexts where investment at the group level is unlikely to be beneficial
(e.g. where public goods are likely to be confiscated by other groups before they
are exploited), members of the group may receive better inclusive fitness benefits
from more direct investment e.g. in offspring. This opens the door to the possi-
bility that the proximate mechanisms that lead to punishment serve ultimately
as a distributed mechanism for regulating the level of investment populations
make to that most appropriate for an individual’s socio-economic context.
3.4 Proximate Causes and Consequences of ASP
We now move from ultimate causes and simulations to proximate mechanisms
and explorations of real human data. The first thing worth noting is that the
terminology behind ASP and AP can be quite misleading (Sylwester et al.,
2013b,a). Firstly, ‘altruistic’ punishment is not generally altruistic in intention.
Proximately, costly punishment is frequently motivated by aggressive tenden-
cies. Secondly, ASP is not always aimed at the top contributors, and cannot be
ascribed entirely to revenge. ASP occurs even in the first round, before anyone
has been punished. Sometimes ASP is aimed from the lowest contributor to the
second-lowest contributor, in an apparent effort to make them produce more
public goods while allowing the punisher to continue to free ride. When this
occurs, ASP can actually be seen as an altruistic act, because the punisher pays
a penalty, and the other members of the group (those who are not the punishee)
benefit just as much as the punisher if the punishee increases their contribu-
tion. In fact, those who never punish (a sizeable minority) could also be seen as
free-riders in cultures where punishment leads to an increase in the public good.
The fact that this terminology is misleading does not mean it should be
abandoned. ASP and AP both have clear definitions (as given in our Introduc-
tion), and clear correlates with important measures of economic wellbeing (as
demonstrated by Herrmann et al., 2008a). But we need to remember not to as-
sociate the obvious moralistic assessments with these terms, and more generally
that socio-economic behaviour, dependencies and outcomes are highly complex.
Further, as has often been noted, most contemporary human experimental sub-
jects are University undergraduates, and universities have historically been most
prominent in countries that are high in indices such a wealth, democracy and
rule of law (Henrich et al., 2010). As Herrmann et al. (2008a) have shown, these
societies express relatively little ASP, and as a consequence antisocial punish-
ment has been regarded as a marginal phenomenon, perhaps explicable simply
as revenge taken by those punished altruistically (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002).
One might expect that ASP would lead directly to reduced contributions
just as AP leads to increases, but in fact victims’ responses to ASP are much
less directed than victims’ responses to AP (Sylwester et al., 2013b). This in-
dicates that the evolutionary ‘strategy’ associated with punishment expression
may well included the punishment response. Without punishment, nearly eighty
percent of individuals maintain from one round to the next their previous level
of investment in the public good. However, among victims of ASP the number
maintaining their previous-round’s strategy falls to nearly forty percent, though
the direction of change shows no clear pattern. In contrast, victims of AP reduce
their probability of repeating their investment level to only twenty percent, and
are much more likely to increase investment than to decrease it. These results are
despite the fact the individuals in these experiments do not know who punished
them, and therefore often cannot determine certainly whether their punishment
was altruistic or antisocial7. However, notice that subjects with very low or very
high prior levels of investment have only one direction to change in.
Given our hypothesis that punishment’s expression may be determined by in
group / out group assessment, we can mine a great deal of psychological literature
for candidate proximate causes in the form of cues that trigger shifts in these
assessments. Sylwester et al. (2013a) explain that we would expect AP to be less
useful when applied to members of out groups, since it might prompt members
of other groups to behave more cooperatively thus decreasing the punisher’s
own group’s relative ranking and therefore (presumably, if there is group-level
competition) resources. Conversely, we would expect ASP to be practiced less in
contexts where the other group members are assessed as ‘in group’. Lamba and
Mace (2012) show empirical evidence supporting this idea. In extremely similar
but discrete populations of a very small-scale minority culture in India (the
Pahari Korwa), Lamba and Mace demonstrate lower levels of ASP in villages
that contain a higher proportion of other cultures as well, compared to villages
exclusively composed of Pahari Korwa. This may indicate that the presence in a
village of a potential out group led subjects of a game played between members
of a single culture to treat each other as in-group. But where the criteria for
selection of experiment participation was not so clearly ethnic (due to only one
ethnicity being present in the village), subjects were more likely to view each
other more as potential competitors.
3.5 Individual Strategies: Variation in ASP Is Best Predicted by
Proportions of Highly Cooperative Actors
Not every individual in a population will necessarily express the same behavioural
strategy in the same immediate context. As explained earlier, we hypothesise
7 Of course, one in four individuals give the least in their group so know any pun-
ishment is altruistic, and the same number contribute the most and know theirs is
antisocial.
that at a population level, the ultimate explanation of variation in punishment
strategies and their associated economic productivity is an optimising response
to local political and economic conditions which can determine the expected out-
come of a public good investment. Therefore, we should expect that whatever
the proximate mechanism for selecting an investment (including punishment)
strategy is, it should respond to evidence or experience indicating changes in
this underlying context. Presumably, each individual responds to their own in-
dividual experience, though this may include the stories they hear from others
and their upbringing. Their exact response may also be determined by other
predispositions such as personality or self-assessed social ranking.
Notice therefore that we do not need to expect everyone in a population to
express the same strategy at the same time. We only expect that first, the net
result of combining these strategies in the proportions found in a population
tracks the underlying context, and second that each of the strategies should be
self-sustaining in the extent they are expressed within that context. MacLean
et al. (2010) document how for even very simple organisms in a simple environ-
ment, it may be easiest to optimise exploitation of that environment by altering
the number of individuals expressing pro- or anti-social behaviour, in the form
of investing in or free riding on public goods.
If AP really did account for cooperative behaviour, we might expect its preva-
lence to correlate with economic performance, and that of free riding to be anti-
correlated. In fact, we have found the reverse. In examining the dataset due to
Herrmann et al. (2008a), we found both free-riding and AP to be fairly con-
sistent across populations. What varies with regional economic performance as
measured by GDP is the proportion of strong Cooperators in a society (defined
below), and the propensity to anti-socially punish cooperators.
To investigate better correlates of decreased contributions we explored the hy-
pothesis that subject pools might differ in the composition of cooperative types.
For clarity (and after some experimentation), we focussed on distinguishing just
two classes of extreme behavioural types from among the participants. Our clas-
sification was based on participants’ behaviour in the very first round of the
first public goods game they played, in cases where no punishment was allowed.
All behavioural economics subjects must demonstrate full comprehension of a
task in a test before they are allowed to participate in an economic game. The
first move therefore signals better than anything else their expectations brought
into the experiment — their interpretation of likely events as well as their own
predispositions. After the first round, PGG subjects are known to demonstrate
significant conformity bias (Carpenter, 2004; Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005).
Extreme contributors tend to move more towards the group average, though still
maintaining a bias towards their initial action.
We classified those who invested their entire initial allocation to the group
account as Cooperators (with a capital C). Those with who did not make any
group investment at all we classified as exploitative Free-riders. The rest (the
vast majority of participants) we did not classify. We reasoned that if a person
devotes their entire allocation to the group welfare, full cooperation is likely their
Proportion of participants
C
ity
 gG
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
5
'I' 'IB 'IA 'I3 'I4
Free-riders
Cooperators
Zurich g37I45
StI Gallen g37I45
Seoul gA3I95
Samara gBAIB5
Riyadh gB6I75
Nottingham g35IB5
Muscat gB8I85
Minsk g8I95
Melbourne g3AI95
Istanbul g9IB5
DnipropetrovsNk g7I65
Copenhagen g36I55
Chengdu g7I65
Boston g43I45
Bonn g3BIB5
Athens gA6I'5
Fig. 3: Proportion of participants that contributed all (Cooperators) or nothing
(Free riders) by city from the Herrmann et al. (2008a).
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Fig. 4: Subject pools plotted by mean amount of ASP (y axis) and the proportion
of subjects who contributed all of their available resources (20 tokens) in the first
round.
default behaviour when interacting with strangers. Analogously, we assumed that
people who do not make any effort to support their new group have a tendency
to behave in an exploitative fashion, or at least not to trust others to cooperate.
We found that the variation across subject pools in the proportion of Co-
operators is much greater than the variation in the proportion of Free-riders
(see Figure 3), Levene’s test = 6.71, p = 0.01; MFREE − RIDERS = 0.10,
SD = 0.05, MCOOPERATORS = 0.20, SD = 0.11. We then ran correlations,
to determine whether there is a link between the proportion of cooperative types
in a subject pool and the mean expenditure on ASP. The correlation between
AP and the proportion of Cooperators (r = 0.35, p > 0.05) was not significant.
Neither was the correlation between AP and Free-riders (r = −0.18, p > 0.05),
nor between the proportion of Free-riders and ASP (r = −0.20, p > 0.05). In con-
trast, we found a strong anticorrelation between the proportion of Cooperators
and ASP (r = −0.62, p < 0.01, Figure 4).
This means contrary to expectation that the variation between cultures may
be primarily the difference between the probability of individuals playing an
optimistic, Cooperative strategy. Such behaviour may inhibit expression of ASP
even in regions / socio-economic contexts where we had hypothesised unexpected
generosity served as a trigger — where it was likely to be viewed as a competitive
or dominance-seeking act. Perhaps extreme cooperation signals in-group affili-
ation. However, anticorrelation does not allow us to infer causation. It may be
that expecting antisocial punishment inhibits reckless tendencies for Coopera-
tion. Our findings do however suggest more environmentally-determined plastic-
ity in the proportion of individuals with cooperative, rather than exploitative,
predispositions. A multiple regression shows that a number of socio-economic
factors predict the proportion of Cooperators but not Free-riders. Our analysis
is the first to demonstrate that the distributions of extreme cooperative, but not
uncooperative, tendencies differ across human populations.
4 Summary and Implications
In the previous section we documented our contributions to the behavioural
anthropology of human economic decision making, many of which derive from
our taking an evolutionary approach and perspective. The assumption of this
work is the standard one made in biology: that the seemingly bizarre behaviour
of ASP must be a part of a behavioural strategy that is generally advantageous
— or at least not disadvantageous — to people living in some cultural contexts,
presumably the ones in which it is found. To briefly summarise some of our
findings:
– ASP has a disruptive more than a reliably ‘down-regulating’ influence on
cooperation. It does not reduce cooperation as reliably as AP increases it,
but it does tend to alter investment behaviour, though again AP is even
more likely to result in changed behaviour.
– Down regulating cooperation might make sense for an individual if that indi-
vidual’s wellbeing is determined more by local competition (e.g. who is most
dominant in a household, village or business) than by global competition
(e.g. which household, village or business does best.)
– ASP seems to be expressed more frequently in contexts where group members
do not by default expect other group members to be members of their in
group. With respect to the previous point, this implies that there is always
some cohort of trusted individuals, the question may be how large that cohort
is by default. In Northern Europe (and Boston, the only US city surveyed
here), the in group seems to encompass group sizes at least as large as a
single university, while in Greece, Turkey, the Middle East and the former
Soviet Union it does not.
– Whatever the default level of in-group assessment is, some manipulations
might alter this. The only ones we could explore without performing human
subject experiments was the natural experiment of seeing how subjects re-
spond to having someone in their group who contributes all of their resources
to the public good, and of having someone in the group who contributes
none. Interestingly, we have learned here that having super-defectors in the
group has no effect, but having super-cooperators in the group is correlated
with reduced level of ASP. This might mean that people inclined to ASP are
impressed by such a clear expression of in-group assessment, and have some
tendency to believe and adopt it. This hypothesis needs to be checked.
4.1 Applications to Policy
This last point — that manipulations which increase the probability of in-group
assessment might also decrease levels of ASP and increase economic viability
overall — is one of obvious potential, should experimentation bear it out. The
one potential manipulation for which we have any data though may be diffi-
cult to replicate. Even if having group members that make extremely altruis-
tic contributions does inhibit competitive tendencies rather than just covarying
with such inhibition, the experimental context is highly unusual because of its
transparency. All subjects know they have equal access to information and equal
power under the authority of the experimenter. In a more realistic context, show-
ing total economic commitment or some other signal of in-group affiliation may
be difficult to control, particularly by outsiders. There may however be other
team-building exercises that would have at least local efficacy in facilitating
negotiations.
Many people likely to read this chapter can recognise and identify with the
in-group assessment apparently made by subjects from Boston (Harvard) and
the Northern European universities tested. Knowing someone else has chosen
the same college or university as we have, particularly in the same or similar
year, does indicate a likely similarity. An undergraduate degree is a significant
investment — even where tuition is free, a degree requires 3–5 years of a person’s
life. For many of us, making similar investments at this scale is enough to incline
us towards in-group trust, but then we live in societies with a high Rule of Law
(cf. Section 2). Understanding the social experience of those who cannot make
this assumption about their colleagues requires effort for those who can. However,
almost anyone will have had some experience of being in a situation where we
were not sure everyone in the room was interested in collaborating for our mutual
common good — where we have felt in danger of exploitation. Realising that in
some cultures that feeling appears to extend even to the prestigious university
campuses that Herrmann et al. (2008a) chose to study8. This might indicate that
it could be unexpectedly challenging to achieve trust and therefore high levels
of economic cooperation in other professional contexts as well as a university.
We must remember that in every society studied, ASP was practiced by
some participants, but similarly in no society was it practiced by all. It may
be that further experiments will identify in advance personality indicators for
predisposition to ASP (e.g. Czibor and Bereczkei, 2012). On the other hand,
8 Because the initial studies were conducted at ETH, it was considered essential that
representatives from other cultures were also drawn from top universities to increase
comparability.
these may not exist. ASP may respond primarily to a combination of present
and cultural context, combined with an element of stochasticity. However, even
if we could determine who practices ASP, we have no idea of what the broader
impact for a society would be if these individuals were excluded from positions
of power or negotiation. As we mentioned, in some circumstances reducing group
size or down-regulating public investment may make economic sense, thus those
able to recognise this may be important members of a society or organisation.
We also do not know for sure that decreasing ASP and/or increasing co-
operation would increase GDP. The causality could well be reversed — where
individuals are aﬄuent they can take more risks about in-group inclusiveness.
It seems likely though to be a situation of mutual feedback, and that if honest,
transparent signals of mutuality of interest can be established, higher levels of
both cooperation and economic performance could be established.
4.2 Conclusion
To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater
benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love, but
really secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor
that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there where
he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thral-
dom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom; which is to one’s
equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one whom we ac-
knowledge for superior inclines to love; because the obligation is no new
depression: and cheerful acceptation (which men call gratitude) is such
an honour done to the obliger as is taken generally for retribution. . . —
Hobbes (1651)
Our work has shown that Hobbes was amazingly prescient concerning the
creation of public goods given that he wrote in the seventeenth century, but
not entirely right. Our research indicates that anti-social punishment may in-
deed occur in contexts where other participants are not mutually-acknowledged
members of trusted group, and a gift from an anonymous peer may be met with
suspicion or loathing. However, we have also seen that generosity may in absence
of other information be taken as an indication that in fact trust is merited, and
generosity should be accepted.
We have found that costly punishment is best understood as having impact
not only on global economics but also on individual competition, and that the
apparently-maladaptive behaviour of anti-socially punishing those more gener-
ous than ourselves may even in some contexts be a sensible response. When
an actor’s own wellbeing is (or at least appears to be) most determined by
their relative dominance to their local neighbours, rather than to how well the
neighbourhood performs as a whole, then it may be worth sacrificing immediate
opportunities if longer-term benefits e.g. in terms of in-group status result. For
organisations that are more concerned about global than local good, the best
course of action is probably to first promote the likelihood that the benefits of
public goods are shared by those who invest in them, and second to promote
transparency, so that all parties involved in investment decisions can be assured
that their interests are protected.
Throughout this chapter we have taken the perspective that the failure to find
communal economic optima is fundamentally negative, since it means resources
are wasted in conflict and all parties have less access to wealth and its associated
wellbeing. Assuming this, the most directly applicable avenue for future research
might be to discover how easily or quickly the social characteristics leading to this
failure can be altered. Measures available could be either either cognitive, such
as increased transparency or reliability in the distribution of economic resources,
or emotional, such as team building or other stage setting for triggering a state
of emotional inclusiveness. If such measures work, a societies’ citizens and / or
leaders could be trained to recognise, exploit or promote contexts where mutually
advantageous outcomes were possible. However, it may be that for some societies
such interventions would be impossible, impractical or unethical. Even in such
cases, we could at least hope that the outcome of research in this area would still
be beneficial. It would help us to at least identify, characterise and possibly come
to understand cultures with such differences. This might be useful for selecting
strategies in cross-party negotiations, or in choosing between economic policy
options or approaches to development.
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